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We analyze 4 characteristic functions $ V^\alpha $, $ V^\delta $, $ V^\zeta $, and $ V^\eta $, and give a necessary condition for these functions to satisfy the relation $ V^\alpha - V^\delta = V^\zeta - V^\eta $ for all coalitions $ S $. To do so, we define and formally analyze the class of additively separable games. It is shown that many important types of games, both static and dynamic, belong to this class.
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